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Chapter 7 
Pakistan 
Ayesha Shahid  and Isfandyar Ali Khan  
Abstract A general view prevalent in Pakistan based on classical Hanafi principles is that in 
cases of marital breakup the father is to be given custody of a male child at the age of seven 
and custody of a female child on her attaining puberty. However the emphasis on the principle 
of the ‘best interests of the child’, as introduced in the Guardians and Wards Act 1890, remains 
a priority of the judges in Pakistan. This country report traces the evolution and development 
of the best interests of the child principle in Pakistani child law. By including a review of 
judicial cases from 1997 to 2014, the report evaluates the application of this principle by the 
superior judiciary in Pakistan.  
Keywords Pakistan • Child Custody • Best interests of the child • Islamic law • Guardians 
and Wards Act 1890 • Superior Judiciary 
Contents 
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 2 
7.2 Historical Overview of Custody and Guardianship Law in Pakistan .................................... 3 
7.3 Constitutional and Legislative Reform in Pakistan ............................................................... 7 
7.3.1 The Creation of Pakistan: Constitutional Framework and the Quest for 
Muslim Identity .......................................................................................................... 7 
7.3.2 Pakistan’s Commitment to International and Regional Human Rights and 
Child Rights Instruments ............................................................................................ 8 
7.3.3 The UK/Pakistan Judicial Protocol and Child Abduction ........................................ 10 
7.3.4 Foreign Orders ......................................................................................................... 13 
7.3.5 Institutional and Legislative Measures at Federal and Provincial Levels 
under the 18th Constitutional Amendment ............................................................... 14 
7.3.6 Legislative Measures at Federal and Provincial Levels ............................................ 15 
7.4 Parental Care and the Principle of the Best Interests of the Child in Pakistani Law ........... 16 
7.4.1 Features/Characteristics/Duality of the Pakistani Family Law System .................... 16 
7.4.2 The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Act VIII of 1890) ......................................... 20 
7.4.3 Law of Guardianship in Pakistan ............................................................................. 23 
7.4.4 Judicial Decisions in Custody and Guardianship Cases in Pakistan ......................... 26 
                                                          
 Ayesha Shahid is a lecturer in law in Brunel Law School, Brunel University London. 
 
Ayesha Shahid () 
e-mail: ayesha.shahid@brunel.ac.uk 
 
Isfandyar Ali Khan is a practicing lawyer and a development practitioner in Pakistan with special-
ization in Alternative and Community Based Dispute Resolution, Access to Justice, Human Rights, 
Democracy and Governance. 
 
Isfandyar Ali Khan () 
e-mail: isfandyaralikhan@yahoo.co.uk 
2  Ayesha Shahid  and Isfandyar Ali Khan  
7.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 34 
References .................................................................................................................................... 35 
7.1 Introduction 
The independence of the Indian sub-continent from British colonial rule, and its sub-
sequent partition into two independent states, led to the creation of Pakistan.1 Paki-
stan was carved out of the Muslim majority areas of British India in 1947 as a result 
of the demand of the Muslim population of British India to be given their own sep-
arate homeland. The majority of the Pakistanis are Sunni Muslims and are followers 
of the Hanafi school of thought.2 A general view prevalent in Pakistan based on 
classical Hanafi principles is that in cases of marital breakup the father is to be given 
custody of a male child at the age of seven and custody of a female child on her 
attaining puberty. However the courts in Pakistan have deviated from this classical 
Hanafi principle and have based their judgments on the ‘Best Interests of the Child’ 
principle. This country report aims (i) to trace the trajectory of this notion in Paki-
stan’s legislation, (ii) to analyze the reasons for establishing it as a fundamental prin-
ciple in child law in Pakistan and (iii) to detect the ways in which the superior judi-
ciary in Pakistan perceives and interprets this notion. It addresses the question to 
what extent the courts in Pakistan have deviated from applying the classical Islamic 
law of hadana (custody) and wilaya (guardianship) in custody and guardianship 
cases by examining the judgments of the superior courts from 1997 to 2014.3  
The first section examines the evolution and development of the ‘Best Interests 
of the Child’ principle in the Indian sub-continent within the wider frame of British 
colonial rule in the Indian sub-continent. It analyzes the concept of hadana (custody) 
and wilaya (guardianship) in the light of rules laid down in Hedaya and Fatawa-i-
Alamgiri, the two classical commentaries on Islamic law. In the second section, post-
                                                          
1 Under the Constitution, Pakistan is a federal republic comprising five provinces: Baluchistan, 
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pukhtun Khawa and the Gilgit Biltistan province, which are ethnically, lin-
guistically and culturally diverse regions. In addition to the provinces, Pakistan also consists of 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, the Federally Ad-
ministered Northern Area, and the Islamabad Capital Territory. Also, the western part of the former 
princely state of Kashmir (Azad Jammu) is de facto controlled and administered by Pakistan. There 
are an estimated 177.1 million people in Pakistan. Of the total, around 91.59 million are male and 
85.51 million are female. The population of children and adolescents, ages 0 to 19, is estimated to 
be around 82.05 million, which is projected to increase to 84 million in 2015 and 86 million in 
2020. From 1998 to 2010, an additional 28 million children and adolescents were added to the total 
existing population (Bureau of Statistics).  
2 Nearly all Pakistanis are Muslims (97 per cent), with Sunnis the clear majority within this group 
(77 per cent) and Shiites the minority (20 per cent). Religious minority groups (3 per cent) include 
Christians, Hindus, and Parsees. 
3 For a comprehensive and thorough analysis of case law from 1947 to 1997 see Ali and Azam 
1998. 
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colonial constitutional debates and legislative reforms in Pakistan are assessed. Pa-
kistan’s international and regional commitments to child rights are examined in this 
section with a particular focus on the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
SAARC Convention on the Promotion of Child Welfare in South Asia, and the UK-
Pakistan Protocol. This section also highlights the institutional measures and recent 
legislative changes at the federal and provincial levels that have taken place in Paki-
stan under the 18th Constitutional Amendment. Section three provides a detailed 
analysis of various provisions of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 (Act VIII of 
1890) in relation to the welfare of the child principle. This section also analyzes 
custody and guardianship cases decided by the superior judiciary from 1997 to 2014 
to assess the responses of the judiciary and the frames of reference used by the courts 
while interpreting the best interests of the child principle.  
7.2 Historical Overview of Custody and Guardianship Law in 
Pakistan  
The historical evolution of the custody and guardianship law followed in Pakistan 
can be traced back to the Anglo-Mohammadan law introduced by the British colo-
nizers in the Indian sub-continent. Prior to the British rule, when the Indian sub-
continent was governed by the Muslim Mughal dynasty, Islamic law generally held 
the field and remained the law of the land in settling civil and criminal disputes.4 
Courts were also established by the Mughal rulers at the central, provincial, district, 
and tehsil (Pargana) levels.5 These courts had defined jurisdiction in civil, criminal, 
and revenue matters and operated under the authority of the ruler. Common customs 
and traditions, however, were also invoked in settling secular matters as these rulers 
were not particularly keen on applying Islamic law to each and every sphere of life 
and let the indigenous customs and institutions continue side by side with Islamic 
law and institutions.6 Qadis and Muftis took local custom into consideration when 
applying the law. While interpreting the law, the Qadis primarily relied on using 
independent reasoning or Ijtihad. But when the British came to India they introduced 
a new system of courts for ‘maintain[ing] effective political control with minimal 
military involvement’.7 
When the British arrived in India in 1772 they were bewildered by the diversity 
of customary rules, norms and practices as well as the vastly different views on mar-
riage, succession, contract, severance, property, and inheritance rights that governed 
a range of ethnic and religious communities. These communities had their own com-
plex system of community-based, informal juridical hearing courts or panchayats. 
The British rulers contemplated that to achieve economic and political stability in 
                                                          
4 Bilmoria n.d. 
5 Hussain 2011, p 5. 
6 Hussain 2011, p 6. 
7 Bilmoria n.d. 
4  Ayesha Shahid  and Isfandyar Ali Khan  
India, it was necessary to establish ‘Rule of Law with the declared consistency, clar-
ity, certainty, and finality of statutes or black letter law’.8 To simplify and facilitate 
this task, the British moulded un-codified Islamic law into a fixed set of Islamic rules 
for ease of application by the colonial courts and the English judges who were unfa-
miliar with the customary and religious law. The then Governor-General, Warren 
Hastings, initiated a legislative reform process through the codification of laws. The 
result was a series of enactments which included the Code of Civil Procedure (1908), 
the Penal Code (1860), and the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898). In the area of 
personal law the British, in consultation with indigenous legal experts, Hindu Pan-
dits and the Ulemas, devised the so-called Anglo-Hindu law for Hindus and Anglo- 
Mohammedan law for Muslims, along with separate personal laws for Indian Chris-
tians.9 These laws remained operative even after the independence from British co-
lonial rule. While framing laws for the Muslims in India, the British relied specifi-
cally on the commentaries of Hedaya and Fatawa-i-Alamigiri, which were based on 
the teachings of the Hanafi school of thought.10 These commentaries were followed 
as a final and unquestionable authority by the judges and legal scholars of the Indian 
sub-continent in family matters. The area of child custody largely reflects this posi-
tion, and even in recent cases courts have cited these two documents as the highest 
source of authority for Hanafi jurisprudence. 
Following the principles of classical Islamic law, the two commentaries laid down 
rules for awarding guardianship and custody. The Arabic term ‘hadana’ has been 
used commonly by South Asian writers for custody of a child, following its use in 
Hamilton’s Hedaya and Baillie’s Digest.11 By contrast, the Arabic term wilayat is 
sometimes defined as a right12 or power13 and sometimes as a duty14 ‘incumbent on 
a person on the grounds of kinship, by testament or by court order towards another 
person of imperfect or no legal capacity’,15 e.g. for ‘an infant, an idiot or a lunatic’.16 
Guardianship was divided into three types. Guardianship for purposes of mar-
riage, guardianship (wilayah) for purposes of management and preservation of prop-
erty, and guardianship (custody or hadana) for purposes of bringing up children. It 
also laid down three ways of appointment (1) by natural right, (2) by testament, and 
(3) by appointment by a judge. Guardianship for the purpose of marriage is allowed 
                                                          
8 Bilmoria n.d. 
9 Bilmoria n.d. 
10 The 12th century Central Asian lawyer Burhanuddin al-Marghinani was the author of Hedaya. 
Hedaya was the standard legal text book in Muslim India and it remained the basis of Muslim law 
for centuries. Commissioned by Warren Hastings, Hedaya was translated by Charles Hamilton in 
1791. Fatawa-i-Alamgiri is a collection of authoritative fatwas compiled under the orders of Mo-
ghul Emperor Aurangzeb in the seventeenth century by a panel of ulama headed by Shaikh Nizam 
Buhanpuri. This was again translated under the orders of Warren Hastings, by N.B.E Baillie under 
the title of A Digest of Moohummudan Law, Part I in 1957. 
11 Hamilton 1982 and Baillie 1957. 
12 Rahim 1911, p 343. 
13 Mahdi and Malek 1998, p 156. 
14 Nasir 2009, p 186. 
15 Nasir 2009, p 186. 
16 Rahim 1911, p 344. 
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because of the necessity of a proper and suitable match, which may not always be 
available. It belongs to the father and grandfather or to the paternal uncle or a guard-
ian appointed by the court in their absence. When a minor is given in marriage by a 
guardian other than the father or the grandfather, the minor may exercise the option 
of puberty to ask the court to annul the marriage. If it was the father or the grandfa-
ther who consented to the marriage, a legal presumption is raised that they acted in 
the best interests of the minor. The presumption is, however, not conclusive and such 
a marriage can also be set aside where it is plainly undesirable and injurious to the 
minor, for instance, where the father is not a man of proper judgment or is of reckless 
character and has married his minor daughter to an immoral man. Abu Yousuf and 
Imam Muhammad, the disciples of Imam Abu Hanifa, consider that an evidently 
unequal or undesirable marriage or a marriage for less than a proper dower of a minor 
female is not valid, but Imam Abu Hanifa does not share this view. According to the 
principles laid down in Hedaya the guardianship of a minor for the management and 
preservation of his/her property devolves (1) first on his/ her father, (2) then on the 
father’s executor, (3) next on the paternal grandfather, (4) then on his executor, (5) 
then on the executors of such executors, and (6) finally on the ruling power or his 
representative – i.e. a qazi or judge. Ultimately it rests upon the qazi to appoint a 
guardian for an infant’s property when there is no near guardian (i.e. the father, the 
father’s father, and their executors). The other paternal kinsmen, who are termed 
‘remote kindred’, and the mother succeed, according to proximity, to the guardian-
ship of an infant for the purpose of education and marriage. They do not have the 
right to be guardians of the minor’s property unless appointed to do so by the ruling 
authorities, or unless appointed to be a guardian in the original proprietor’s will, 
which has been duly attested by competent witnesses. The general rule is that a 
guardian, executor, or anyone who has the care of the person and property of a minor 
can enter into a contract for the ward which is (or is likely to be) advantageous and 
not injurious to the ward. A guardian may sell or purchase moveable items on behalf 
of his/her ward, either for an equal rate or at such a rate that may leave a slight loss, 
but not at such a rate which would make the loss great and apparent.17 
It is interesting to note that there is no clear distinction made between custody and 
guardianship at all times; as a result their relationship necessarily manifests ‘a com-
plex structure of rights and duties distributed between the entitled person(s)’.18 Cus-
tody is often perceived only as a form of ‘guardianship of person’, as it rests with 
the mother only during the early years of the child; the natural guardianship being 
always entrusted with the father. Thus Jamal Nasir had described hadana as ‘the 
earliest form of guardianship of person’,19 when the mother is needed to nurse an 
infant and to care for, bring up or raise a child. 
 Under classic Hanafi law, as followed in the commentaries mentioned above, 
custody (hadana) belongs to the mother for a girl up to the age of puberty and for a 
boy up to the age of seven, while wilayah belongs to the father. The father’s custody 
                                                          
17 Hamilton 1982, vol. 4, p 553. 
18 Mahdi and Malek 1998, p 157. 
19 Nasir 2009, p 186. 
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continues until puberty for a boy and not just until puberty for a girl, but rather until 
she can safely be left to herself and trusted to take care of herself. The mother’s right 
to the custody of her infant child is subject to certain other limitations; for example, 
she loses her right if she has become an apostate, leads an immoral life, is wicked, 
or is unworthy to be trusted and neglects to take proper care of the child.20 If a mother 
is disqualified from exercising custody, then the custody of a female child is awarded 
to the child’s maternal or paternal grandmother how high soever.21  
Detailed rules were also laid down to determine the place or location where the 
child could remain in the custody of the mother.22 A boy or a girl having passed the 
period of hadana has no option to be with one parent in preference to the other; 
instead he or she must necessarily remain in the charge of the father.  
Bearing in mind the classical rules as laid down in the various commentaries 
based on classical Sunni Hanafi jurisprudence, the British enacted the Guardians and 
Wards Act in 1890. The major part of this Anglo-Muhammadan law was assimilated 
into Pakistani law through art. 224 of the 1956 Pakistan Constitution, which pro-
vided for the incorporation of pre-existing law ‘save as is otherwise expressly pro-
vided in the Constitution’ and ‘so far as is applicable and with necessary modifica-
tions.’23 
                                                          
20 Baillie 1957, p 728. 
21 If the grandmother has died or is married to a stranger, then the full sister is entitled. If the sister 
has died or is married to a stranger, then the half-sister of the mother (uterine and consanguine 
sister) is entitled to custody of the child. In the absence of a sister, the daughter of the full sister and 
then the daughter of the half-sister (consanguine and uterine) can have the custody of the girl child. 
In the same way the maternal aunt and then the paternal aunts how high soever can have the custody. 
In the absence of the mother and other female relations, custody belongs to the father and other 
male relations in the same order as that of maternal relations. If the mother remarries, she forfeits 
her right to custody. A mother is disqualified if she marries a man not related to the child within 
the prohibited degrees. This rule is strictly applied in cases that involve custody of a female child, 
but if the subsequent marriage is dissolved by death or divorce then the right to custody will revive.  
22 According to the rules laid down in Hedaya, before the completion of iddah the proper location 
to exercise hadana is the domicile of the parents. None of the parents can take the child out of the 
custody of the latter. After completion of her iddah, a mother may take her child to her own birth-
place provided that the marriage had been contracted there, and that it is so close to the husband’s 
residence that the husband can visit the child and return to his residence before nightfall. There is 
also no objection to her moving with the child from a village to the city or chief town of the district 
if this is advantageous to the child and in no way injurious to the father. If the child’s mother is 
dead and hadana has passed to the maternal grandmother, the child cannot be taken to the grand-
mother’s own city, even though the marriage had taken place there.  
23 Davis 1985, p 119. 
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7.3 Constitutional and Legislative Reform in Pakistan 
7.3.1 The Creation of Pakistan: Constitutional Framework and 
the Quest for Muslim Identity  
At the time of its creation, the founder and first Governor-General of Pakistan, Mo-
hammad Ali Jinnah, envisaged Pakistan as a secular state and not a theocratic state. 
He elaborated on this idea in his presidential address to the Constituent Assembly 
on 11 August 1947, in which he clearly stated:  
You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business 
of the state … there is no discrimination, no distinction between one caste or creed and 
another … [The] fundamental principle [is] that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one 
state … in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be 
Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but 
in the political sense as citizens of the State. 
While outlining the contours of a secular state, he also stated that the members of 
each religious community would be free to go to their respective places of worship. 
In his presidential address he laid the foundations of a modern and democratic Paki-
stan where everyone was equal before and afforded the protection of the law. How-
ever, soon after his death the advocates of religious nationalism started asserting 
their position in the Constituent Assembly. Since then major debates have focused 
on the appropriate role of Islam in the state, the implementation of Islamic law, and 
the Islamization of society. Thus religion has been manipulated and used for political 
purposes and imposed in a selective and narrowly defined manner, often serving to 
bolster insecure regimes since the early days of independence.24 Both religious and 
liberal groups have played the ‘Islamic card’ as soon as they realized that religion 
was the only binding force to bring together an otherwise multi-ethnic and culturally 
diverse community.25 The religious and conservative forces also demanded a clear 
manifestation of Islamic identity. This was clearly reflected when in 1949, soon after 
independence, the First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan passed the Objectives 
Resolution to maintain its Islamic identity. The Objectives Resolution reiterates that 
‘sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Almighty God alone and efforts 
shall be made to enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the teaching 
and requirements of Islam’. The Objectives Resolution privileged one religion over 
all others but was still passed, overriding the serious concerns of the minority mem-
bers of the Constituent Assembly.  
Later Pakistan was declared an Islamic Republic under the 1956 Constitution. 
Art. 198 of the Constitution provided that the legislature would bring all laws into 
conformity with the ‘Injunctions of Islam’. It also prohibited the enactment of any 
law repugnant to Islam. As compared to the 1956 Constitution, any reference to the 
                                                          
24 Critelli 2012, p 676. 
25 Ali 2012, p 45. 
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injunctions of Islam was initially excluded in the 1962 Constitution. Following pro-
tests from the National Assembly, however, the Islamic provisions of the 1956 Con-
stitution were reinserted, and the word ‘Islamic’ was also reinserted into the official 
name of the state.  
The 1973 Constitution of Pakistan, clearly states in its preamble that ‘all laws 
have to be in conformity with the Qur’an and Sunnah’. Islam was officially declared 
as the state religion in the 1973 Constitution. The Islamic character of the Constitu-
tion was further strengthened when, in 1985, art. 2-A was incorporated into the 1973 
Constitution so as to require that all laws be consistent with the injunctions of Islam 
as laid down in the Qur’an and Sunnah. The effect of this move was to render Islamic 
law the constitutional basis of all state law.26 One can thus argue that religion and 
Muslim identity have played a dominant role in framing the constitutional history of 
Pakistan. The constitutional history of Pakistan laid down the ideological parameters 
of the state and defined its duties and obligations towards Islam.27  
In addition to Islamic provisions, the protection of marriage, family, mother, and 
child is an acknowledged policy principle under art. 35 of the 1973 Constitution. 
Pakistan’s commitment to children is enshrined in the Constitution as art. 35 binds 
the state to ‘protect … the mother and the child’. Art. 37 of the 1973 Constitution 
lays down commitments for promoting social justice and eradication of social evils. 
This includes the state’s obligation ‘to remove illiteracy and provide free and com-
pulsory secondary education within minimum possible period’ and to ‘make provi-
sion for securing just and humane conditions of work, ensuring that children and 
women are not employed in vocations unsuited to their age or sex, and for maternity 
benefits for women in employment’.28 This is further strengthened by the inviolabil-
ity of the privacy of the home, which is a fundamental right under art. 14 of the 1973 
Constitution. These provisions support parental guidance through the institution of 
marriage and the strengthening of the family as the primary unit of the social system, 
within the inviolable right of privacy of the home. Respect for the responsibility, 
rights, and authority of parents flows naturally from these provisions, which are also 
considerably supported by Islamic traditions and norms. The family system in Paki-
stan provides a traditional safety net to all the family members in which women and 
children enjoy emotional, social, and economic security. Joint family systems and 
extended family systems are prevalent. Even people living in nuclear families have 
close links with their extended families.  
7.3.2 Pakistan’s Commitment to International and Regional 
Human Rights and Child Rights Instruments  
Pakistan is a party to several UN human rights instruments that deal with child rights, 
including the international Bill of Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child 1990 to name a few. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, 
                                                          
26 Yefet 2009, p 349. 
27 Ahmad 1993, p 40.  
28 Art. 37(b) and art. 37(e) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
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stressed that ‘motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and protection’ 
and referred to the family as the natural and fundamental group unit of society. The 
foundation of the rights and principles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides a legal as well as a moral obligation for countries to respect the human 
rights of each individual, including children. Pakistan has ratified the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 2008) and the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 2010). Ratification of these 
international treaties imposes further obligations on Pakistan to take measures for 
providing a conducive environment for the protection of children’s rights in the 
country. The Government of Pakistan ratified the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCRC) on 12 December 1990. At the time of ratification, 
Pakistan made a general reservation that the provisions of the UNCRC shall be in-
terpreted according to the principles of Islamic principles and values. The reserva-
tion was withdrawn on 23 July 1997. The UNCRC has not been incorporated into 
the national law in Pakistan and is therefore not directly enforceable in national 
courts. International conventions are not enforceable in Pakistan until there is ena-
bling legislation making them the law of the land. Pakistan has not introduced any 
such law in regard to the UNCRC, and therefore the Convention cannot be invoked 
in the courts. In addition, in 2001 the Government of Pakistan signed the Optional 
Protocol to the UNCRC on the sale of children, child prostitution, and child pornog-
raphy which was ratified in 2011. The Government of Pakistan has also signed the 
Optional Protocol to the UNCRC on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
in 2001, but it has not been ratified. 
The provisions of art. 12 of the UNCRC do not have specific comparable provi-
sions in Pakistani law. Pakistan is a federal state in which every province has sepa-
rate legislation on issues of family law and child welfare. There is no mechanism to 
unify the legislation, and thus different provisions apply in the different provinces.29 
The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, in its Concluding Observations to 
the Pakistan’s Country Report, has urged Pakistan to ensure that the principle of the 
best interests of the child is formally incorporated into the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches of power by, inter alia, including reference to the best interests of 
the child in legislation as well as in other settings such as cases of divorce involving 
children, kafalah of Islamic law, child protection, guardianship, and juvenile jus-
tice.30 The Committee also recommended that the state party must ensure in practice 
the implementation of this principle in all judicial and administrative decisions and 
in programmes, projects, and services having an impact on children.  
Civil society organizations in Pakistan have been criticizing the pace of imple-
mentation of the UNCRC in domestic legislation. They have also emphasized the 
                                                          
29 Ali and Jamil 1994, p 24. 
30 UNCRC Convention on the Rights of the Child, Distr. General, CRC/C/PAK/CO/3-42 October 
2009, Advance unedited version, Original: English, Committee on the Rights of the Child, Fifty-
second session, Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 44 of the Con-
vention, Concluding observations: Pakistan. 
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need for taking capacity building initiatives required for child protection and juve-
nile justice. At various civil society forums,31 Pakistan has been urged to undertake 
measures to the maximum extent of their available resources, including establishing 
independent monitoring mechanisms; enacting efficient legislation to prohibit and 
prevent the employment of children as domestic workers; ratifying the Optional Pro-
tocol to UNCRC on the involvement of children in armed conflicts; expediting the 
adoption of the Charter of Child Rights Bill which has been pending for many years 
at the national level; strengthening measures aimed at providing protection and as-
sistance to vulnerable segments of society, including those children affected by nat-
ural disasters to protect them from trafficking and exploitation at work; taking steps 
to implement laws and policies with a view to eliminating under-age and forced 
marriage; continuing its efforts for a systematic and sustained training process of 
children as well as developing the Child Protection Management Information Sys-
tem (CPMIS) and advancement in child immunization; and ensuring and allocating 
sufficient resources for girls’ education in all provinces.  
In 2002, during the South Asian Association for Regional Countries’ (SAARC) 
Decade of the Rights of the Child, the Convention on Promotion of Child Welfare 
in South Asia was adopted. The purpose of the Convention is to solidify the com-
mitments that the South Asian countries have made at the world summit and to other 
international bodies by encouraging mutual cooperation and assistance. The aim is 
to protect the rights of the child while realising the full potential of each child and 
the responsibilities and duties of the signatory states. The Convention also provides 
for setting up regional arrangements to assist Member States. The Convention states 
that countries should recognize the rights of a child as laid out in the UNCRC, uphold 
the rights of the family as primary caregivers, and recognize the best interests of the 
child. To achieve their goals, the states’ regional priorities should be recognizing the 
need for essential services such as education and health, both preventive and cura-
tive, and providing appropriate legal and administrative safety nets such as national 
laws that protect the child from abuse, exploitation, neglect, violence, discrimina-
tion, trafficking, and child labor.  
7.3.3 The UK/Pakistan Judicial Protocol and Child Abduction 
Child abduction is an issue that involves disputes of custody and guardianship and 
that gives rise to the question of transnational jurisdiction. In such cases, a parent 
may need to take legal action to secure return of the children. Pakistan has not signed 
or ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child Abduction 1980; 
however, as a party to the UNCRC, Pakistan is under an obligation to ‘take measures 
to combat the illicit transfer and non-return of children abroad’ and to that end must 
‘promote the conclusion of bilateral or multilateral agreement or accession to exist-
ing agreements.’ Under art. 35, the Contracting States must ‘take all appropriate na-
tional, bilateral and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction, the sale of or 
                                                          
31 www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-5-258379-Enforce-child-rights-laws (accessed 1 October 
2015). 
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traffic in children for any purpose or in any form.’ Other relevant obligations are set 
forth in articles 9 and 10, which include the child’s ‘right to maintain contact with 
both parents if separated from one or both’ and the ‘right of children and their parents 
to leave any country and to enter their own in order to be reunited or to maintain the 
child-parent relationship’. Art. 18 embodies the principle that ‘both parents have 
joint primary responsibility for bringing up their children and the State should sup-
port them in this task.’ 
A recent development in relation to child abduction has been that in January 2003 
judges from Pakistan and the UK signed the UK-Pakistan Protocol on Children Mat-
ters. This is a judicial understanding which aims to secure the return of abducted 
children to the country where they normally live, without regard to the nationality, 
culture, or religion of the parents.32 The judges agreed that the child’s welfare is a 
priority and that the courts of the country where the child normally lives are usually 
in the best position to decide on matters of custody and where a child should live. 
The Protocol asks judges to consider any existing court orders made by the courts in 
the child’s ‘home’ country.33 The judge may then order the child to be returned to 
the country where he or she normally lives. Liaison judges have been appointed in 
both the UK and Pakistan to communicate with each other on individual cases to 
ensure that each is aware of court orders from the other’s country. It is important to 
note, however, that the Protocol has not been incorporated into the law of both coun-
tries, and judges are not legally bound to abide by its provisions. Notwithstanding, 
as its provisions are in line with the usual practices of the courts, judges can and do 
make orders referring to the Protocol.  
Pursuant to Sec. 361 of the Pakistan Penal Code it is an offense to remove a male 
child under the age of fourteen or a female child under the age of sixteen from the 
lawful guardian. The case law as to whether this provision can be invoked in cases 
of parental child abduction is conflicting. Although this section has been used against 
a parent who has removed a child from the other parent, case law is more in favor of 
the non-applicability of this section in parental child abduction. The term lawful 
guardian has been interpreted to mean ‘any person lawfully entrusted with the care 
or custody of such minor’. If the removing parent believes themselves to be entitled 
to lawful custody, then this section would not apply to them unless they removed the 
child for an unlawful reason. The superior courts of Pakistan have consistently in-
terpreted the relevant provisions as excluding abduction by a parent, particularly 
when the abducting parent is the father, because in their view the ‘... father of a 
child[,] being always a natural guardian along with the mother, can never be ascribed 
or attributed the offence of kidnapping of his own child ....’. The Lahore High Court 
in Muhammad Ashraf v. SHO and others34 decided in this judgment that the  
                                                          
32 The Protocol can also be used when parents are seeking permission to take a child temporarily to 
Pakistan for a holiday.  
33 For instance, if a child is taken to Pakistan, or does not return from a holiday there, and the parent 
has an existing residence order or a prohibitive order against the person who has taken the child, 
the Protocol can be used to help return the child to the UK. 
34 Muhammad Ashraf v. SHO and others, 2001 P Cr. L J 31. 
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[f]ather of a child is always a natural guardian along with the mother. He can never be 
ascribed or attributed the offence of kidnapping of his own child … The only fetter placed 
upon the right of a father to the custody of the child is that when he takes the child from the 
custody of his wife for a purpose recognized in law as immoral or unlawful, in such a cir-
cumstance removal of the child, would amount to an offence.  
While this view may exonerate the father from penal consequences, it cannot pro-
tect him from actions for the production and custody of the child. 
In Pakistani law, various provisions can be used regarding a case of trans-national 
parental abduction perpetrated by a foreign parent. For example, the case may be 
lodged under Sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC) for the production 
of the child (Power to issue directions of the nature of habeas corpus) and under Secs 
7 or 25 of the Guardians and Wards Act for the custody of the child (respectively, 
Power of the Court to make an order as to guardianship and Title of guardian to 
custody of ward). If it is established that the father or the mother removed the child 
for mala-fide intentions, then he/she is a criminal. Still, the parents are expected to 
produce the child in court and to hand him/her over to the parent to whom the court 
has temporarily granted custody. Violation of the court’s orders would then lead to 
the detention or punishment of the offending parent, even though that parent may be 
the primary caregiver, a situation that is arguably not in the child’s best interests.  
According to the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), child abductions by a non-parent 
are of a criminal nature and are tried before the criminal court. Removal of a child 
by a parent is not criminal and is dealt with by the family or civil court. Conse-
quently, the trans-national movement of a child without the consent of the foreign 
parent would not lead to the detention of the alleged abductor, nor would that parent 
be punished under any section of the PPC for bringing the child to Pakistan. Under 
Sec. 361 of the Pakistan Penal Code, it is an offense to remove a male child under 
the age of fourteen or a female child under the age of sixteen from the lawful guard-
ian. This section lays down that ‘whoever takes or induces any minor under fourteen 
years of age, if a male, or under sixteen years of age if a female, out of the keeping 
of the lawful guardian, is said to kidnap such minor from lawful custody’. The of-
fense of abduction has also been defined under Sec. 362 of the Code, under which 
‘whoever by force compels or by other deceitful means induces any person to go 
from any place is said to have abducted that person.’ 
The matters of custody, wrongful removal, and guardianship of children in Paki-
stan are normally dealt with under the provisions of the Family Courts Act, 1964, 
and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890. Sec. 9 of the Act of 1890 requires that 
application in such cases be made to the Family Court having jurisdiction at a place 
where a minor ordinarily resides. However, one remedy for child abduction that has 
been used with some success in Pakistan is the writ of habeas corpus.35 A writ of 
habeas corpus can also be used in family law, for example a parent who has been 
denied custody of his other children by a trial court or whose child has been illegally 
removed may file a habeas corpus petition. 
                                                          
35 The Extradition Treaty of 1931 was signed under the British mandate and could be used as a 
basis of cooperation in child custody cases. 
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This petition would have previously been made directly to the High Court under 
Sec. 491 of the Criminal Procedures Code or art. 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan. 
However a habeas corpus petition is now normally made to a Court of District or 
Sessions Judges. A petition could still be heard by a High Court, and this depends 
on the discretion of the judge. An application for habeas corpus does not determine 
who should have the ultimate custody of the child, and the application must be at-
tached to a substantive application. 
In the last few years, High Courts throughout Pakistan have dealt with cases in-
volving child abduction in connection with mixed marriages between Pakistanis and 
British, Canadian and French nationals. These cases appear to have been resolved 
judiciously.  
The UK-Pakistan Protocol has been enforced by Pakistani courts, and mothers are 
allowed to take their children back to the United Kingdom. Recently, the High Court 
of Azad Kashmir-Pakistan had a child who had been recovered from the custody of 
the father and handed over to the British mother, Najma Begum, following her ap-
plication. The Court stated that, in light of the Protocol, the relevant court in the 
United Kingdom would have to decide about the future and custody of the child. The 
mother of the child had filed a habeas corpus application with the High Court under 
Sec. 491 of the Cr.PC. 
7.3.4 Foreign Orders 
Although foreign orders are not automatically enforceable, they can be considered 
by Pakistani courts, and the higher the level of the foreign court that issued the order 
the more weight it is accorded in Pakistan. The Civil Procedures Code of 1908 con-
tains provisions for the enforcement of certain foreign decrees, but although custody 
orders can be used as supporting documents, they are not directly enforceable. The 
case of Misbah Rana – a twelve-year-old, Scottish-Pakistani girl – is also quite a 
significant case. In this case Misbah’s mother, Louise Campbell, approached the 
High Court of Lahore and filed a habeas corpus petition against her ex-husband and 
Misbah’s elder sister, both of whom had illegally taken Misbah to Pakistan. The 
mother in this case claimed that Misbah should be sent back to Scotland and the 
custody matter decided by the relevant court in Scotland, as per the Protocol. Louise 
Rana was worried that Misbah would be forced to marry at her early age, whereas 
Misbah consistently denied, through a news conference, that her Pakistani family 
was trying to force her into such a union. After listening to both parties’ arguments, 
the Court ordered that Misbah should be handed over to the British High Commis-
sion within seven days so that the case could be decided as per the Protocol and the 
custody issue heard in Scotland’s relevant court. Upon hearing that she would be 
handed over to her mother, Misbah protested against the Court’s decision and ex-
pressed the desire not to go back to Scotland. Owing to Misbah’s wish to stay with 
her father, both parties decided to settle the issue outside the court. The court allowed 
Misbah to stay with her father and granted access to her mother so that she could 
visit her daughter under certain measures. In this case the High Court violated the 
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UK-Pakistan Protocol, and the child’s custody was decided by mutual agreement. 
However, the court respected Misbah’s point of view, which is central in the field of 
child rights as envisaged in art. 9(2) of the UNCRC: ‘In any proceedings …, all 
interested parties shall be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and 
make their views known.’ Art. 12 of the UNCRC also states that the child’s point of 
view should be taken into consideration by the courts. 
7.3.5 Institutional and Legislative Measures at Federal and 
Provincial Levels under the 18th Constitutional Amendment 
In December 1980 the Government of Pakistan established the National Commission 
for Child Welfare and Development (NCCWD) in order to promote child welfare 
and planning and development. The NCCWD, positioned under the Human Rights 
Division (erstwhile Ministry of Human Rights of Ministry of Law, Justice and Hu-
man Rights), has the mandate to monitor, review, and coordinate the implementation 
of the UNCRC. The Commission consists of several national expert committees, one 
of them being for the protection of rights of children (including juvenile justice, fam-
ily environment, abuse, neglect, exploitation, and child labor).36 At the provincial 
level, the Provincial Commission for Child Welfare and Developments as well as 
the provincial Social Welfare Departments (SWDs) are the main actors which have 
the mandate to monitor progress on the implementation of the UNCRC and its Op-
tional Protocols.  
In the Parliament there are Standing Committees on Human Rights in the National 
Assembly and the Senate that provide oversight on public policy, monitor the human 
and child rights situation in the country, receive complaints on child rights viola-
tions, conduct inquiries, hold hearings, and make recommendations.  
After the 18th Constitutional Amendment, the NCCWD has been consulting with 
and advocating for the establishment of an independent National Commission on the 
Rights of the Child (NCRC) for the effective monitoring of all national and provin-
cial programmes. With an independent status, the NCRC will ensure effective mon-
itoring of national programmes which are designed to directly or indirectly benefit 
children. In this regard, the establishment of the NCRC was announced by the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan in 2012. Pursuant to this announcement, a series of provincial 
and national consultations were held, and a draft bill was finalized for legislation.  
Some other measures taken by the Government of Pakistan include the adoption 
of several programmes in the area of basic health and welfare, including the National 
Hepatitis Control Program (2005-2010), the National Maternal, Newborn and Child 
                                                          
36 Government of Pakistan, Women Development Division, National Commission for Child Wel-
fare and Development. www.pakistan.gov.pk/divisions/ContentListing.jsp?DivID=20&cPath=
185_191_399_404 (accessed 1 October 2015). 
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Health Program (2006-2012), the National Nutrition Program, and the expansion of 
the Lady Health Workers Program.37 
7.3.6 Legislative Measures at Federal and Provincial Levels 
The most significant development with respect to law-making has been the passage 
of the 18th Constitutional Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan in 2010. Con-
sequent to the 18th Amendment, the subject of the child in terms of legislative and 
administrative competence as well as financial authority has been devolved to the 
provinces. The Federal Government, therefore, can now legislate on child related 
issues only in relation to Federal territories and those areas not forming part of a 
province. For instance, the Federal government has adopted legislation in the area of 
education and protection of the child such as the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) 
Free and Compulsory Education Act 2012. Thus child welfare has become a provin-
cial matter. This in turn has brought many challenges for the government, and it has, 
in particular, taken time for provinces to understand their newly assigned roles and 
responsibilities. However, provinces soon realized the mechanics and implications 
of the 18th Amendment, and as a result a number of legislative and administrative 
measures have been taken by the provincial assemblies and provincial governments. 
In the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province, the Child Protection and Welfare Act 
(KPCPWA), 2010, has been enacted, which provides mechanisms at local and pro-
vincial levels for the welfare and protection of children at risk. It is based on the 
principle of the best interests of the child. Under the KPCPWA, the Child Protection 
and Welfare Commission (CPWC) has been established to review provincial laws 
and regulations affecting the status and rights of children and to propose new laws; 
to implement policies for the protection, rehabilitation, and reintegration of children 
at risk; and to monitor the implementation and violation of laws. In KP, CPWC has 
launched an awareness campaign on child rights through print and electronic media 
and has arranged a number of seminars, consultations, and workshops.38 In 2011, the 
KP Government also promulgated the KP Borstal Institutions Act (BIA), under 
which separate detention places will be established for juvenile convicts for their 
basic education and for training regarding their mental, moral, and psychological 
development. In the province of Sindh, the Sindh Child Protection Authority Act 
(SCPAA), 2011, has been promulgated, through which an authority has been consti-
tuted which will monitor and ensure implementation of the child-protection related 
provisions under the UNCRC in the province. The law seeks to establish district 
level child protection institutions. In 2011, the Remand Home Rules were also noti-
fied by the Government of Sindh. The Remand Home is a temporary place of custody 
                                                          
37 Pakistan’s Fifth Periodic Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child on implemen-
tation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, National Commission for Child Welfare and 
Development, Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights Government of Pakistan.  
38 The Commission, through its Child Protection Units (CPUs) located in relevant districts, is rais-
ing awareness on child protection issues. By 2012, a total of 459 (235 male and 224 female) aware-
ness sessions were conducted with 335 Child Protection Centres (CPCs). 
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for child inmates where they are being provided care, protection, and treatment. Un-
der the SCPAA, an eleven member Sindh Child Protection Authority (SCPA) has 
been set up to coordinate and monitor child protection issues at provincial and dis-
trict levels. The Authority is working to establish an institutional mechanism for 
child protection and for the setting of minimum protection and standards for all in-
stitutions relating to children, including educational institutions, orphanages, shelter 
homes, child parks, and hospitals; ensuring implementation is an additional aim. 
KPCPWA and the SCPAA are in conformity with the CRC, in which a child is 
defined as a person below eighteen years of age in accordance with the CRC defini-
tion given in art. 1. These laws use ‘the best interests of child’ as a basic principle in 
taking actions for and against children. In CPWA 2010 the best interests of the child 
is defined as a ‘primary consideration, in all actions either by public or private bod-
ies, for protection, survival, development and participation of children’.  
The next section discusses in detail the family law in Pakistan and provides an in-
depth analysis of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890.  
7.4 Parental Care and the Principle of the Best Interests of the 
Child in Pakistani Law 
7.4.1 Features/Characteristics/Duality of the Pakistani Family 
Law System  
The legal system in Pakistan is based on English Common Law and Islamic law. 
The former is more influential in the area of commercial law while Islamic law prin-
ciples are followed in family law. The key laws governing marital and family rela-
tionships are based on Islamic principles and derive inspiration from the two primary 
sources of Islamic Law, the Qur’an and Sunnah. The principle of Ijtihad and other 
accompanying juristic techniques have also been used by the framers of law to for-
mulate family law in Pakistan. At independence, Pakistan inherited four pieces of 
legislation regarding women’s and children’s rights: the Child Marriage Restraint 
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Act 1929,39 the Shariat Application Act 1937,40 the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages 
Act 1939,41 and the Guardians and Ward Act 1890.42 All personal laws enforced in 
pre-partitioned India are still valid and operative in Pakistan. After independence 
from the British Colonial rule in 1947, no reforms were made to family law in the 
first fourteen years of Pakistan’s history. To review family laws for the first time in 
1951, a seven-member Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, also known as 
the ‘Rashid Commission’, was setup by the government.43 The Commission was es-
tablished with the ostensible aim of identifying areas of reform in family law. The 
Commission submitted its final report along with a dissenting note by a member of 
the Commission. The report stated that Islam is a very progressive religion, and not 
                                                          
39 The framers of the Act, bearing in mind the societal norms, did not invalidate the child marriage. 
However, under the Act the father or the guardian may be punished for contracting their children 
into such marriages. In 2009 a private member bill to amend the CMRA was tabled in the National 
Assembly, the Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Bill, 2009. Among other provisions, it seeks 
to ‘remove the gender disparity in age’ of marriage for males and females and to set eighteen years 
as the minimum age of marriage for both. It also proposes to raise the punishment for violations 
from one month to two years and the fine from one thousand to one hundred thousand rupees. Once 
the age of marriage for females is raised to eighteen years under the CMR (Amendment) Bill, 
amendments will be required in the option of puberty provision in the Dissolution of Muslim Mar-
riage Act 1939 to provide effective relief to victims of under-age marriages. 
40 The second piece of legislation that Pakistan inherited from Pre-Partition India was the Shariat 
Application Act 1937. This act laid down that in family matters regarding Muslims, Muslim per-
sonal law had to be applied. A substantial portion of personal law, therefore, remained un-codified 
and subject to interpretation by the courts. After the creation of Pakistan, the first legislative attempt 
made by the Punjab Legislative Assembly was the New West Punjab Muslim Personal Law (Shar-
iat) Application Act (IX of 1948) that enlarged the scope of personal law to questions relating to 
succession, including succession to agricultural land (whereas the previous Act applied only to 
intestate succession). However these changes were not welcomed in all parts of the country as men 
were still not willing to give women their share in property. As a result, to deprive women of their 
inheritance rights, amendments were made to the same Act in the Province of Sindh and the passage 
‘save questions relating to agricultural land and other than charitable institutions and charitable and 
religious endowments’ was deleted from Sec. 2 of the Shariat Application Act. 
41 The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act 1939 came as a relief for Muslim women who were 
given some protection against the wrongly interpreted and misapplied Islamic divorce laws. Before 
this Act, Muslim women hardly had a basis to get a divorce, and due to the pressure of customary 
practices they were also denied access to the right to divorce by khula. Only men’s right to unilateral 
divorce was accepted. The Act laid down eight grounds for divorce: where the husband’s wherea-
bouts were unknown for four years; the failure to provide maintenance for two years; the failure to 
perform marital obligations for three years; the husband’s impotence, cruelty, and incompatibility 
of temperament; hatred and adultery; insanity or suffering from leprosy or venereal disease; the 
husband’s interference in the wife’s management of her property; and the husband’s interference 
with the performance of the wife’s religious beliefs or practice. On these bases a woman could 
obtain a judicial decree for the dissolution of her marriage (Tanseekh-i- Nikah), this dissolution 
being called Faskh. One important aspect of the Act is that dissolution of marriage does not affect 
a woman’s right to dower or the option of puberty. Moreover, the husband’s consent to the disso-
lution is not needed. These grounds were included by adopting the juristic technique of Talfiq. 
42 To be discussed in detail in the next section. 
43 The Commission was composed of six Modernists (three men and three women) and one Tradi-
tionalist religious scholar, Maulana Ihteshamul Haq. 
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a clergy-dominated religion, and that changes in the law must be brought by exer-
cising the right to Ijtihad. The Commission’s report recommended wide-ranging re-
forms in Muslim family law (divorce, inheritance, and marriage) aimed at enhancing 
the legal status of women. While making its recommendations the Commission gave 
careful consideration to the opinions of learned, liberal, and enlightened persons that 
were obtained from the circulation of a questionnaire. The report of the Commission 
was considered to be a significant document but at the same time a challenge to 
contemporary Muslim thought. The report received severe criticism from different 
religious groups and generated heated debate, with members of the religious com-
munity denouncing its recommendations as ‘distorting the religion of God and [be-
ing] the worst type of heresy.’ The report and the dissent highlighted the conflicting 
views that dominate the politics of family law.  
The question of custody of the child was also raised in the questionnaire drafted 
by the Marriage and Family Laws Commission. The question was as follows:  
At present the mother is entitled to the custody of her minor child only up to [a] certain age 
i.e. the male child up to seven years and [the] female child till she attains puberty. These 
limits have no authority either in Qur’an or Hadith but have been fixed as a result of opin-
ions of some Muslim Jurists. Do you consider it admissible to propose some modifica-
tions?44 
In answer to this question, the Commission stated in its report as follows:  
In the opinion of the Commission it is admissible to propose changes in [a] matter of custody 
of minor children as the Qur’an and Sunnah have not fixed any age limit and some of [the] 
great Mujtahid Imams have expressed the view that the [matter] of age limit in this respect 
is an open question.45 
Maulana Maududi (1903-1979), an eminent Pakistani religious scholar, while ex-
pressing his views on the issue of custody stated: 
The right thing in this regard is that the interest of the child should be kept above everything 
else. In every particular case preference should be given either to the father or mother after 
giving full consideration to the prospects of education and training in their respective cus-
todies … also under [whomsoever’s] custody they might be, no restrictions should be placed 
on children meeting the other party.46 
Justice Tanzil ur Rehman a senior Supreme Court judge stated:  
In granting the right of upbringing, the child’s security and betterment should be kept in 
mind, and as long as there is no ma’ani (hindrance/hurdle) the mother’s custody will be 
preferred. In certain situations, [the] child has to be given the option to choose between the 
two. Sometimes such circumstances may arise in which it would be appropriate to give the 
child to [the] maternal grandmother or maternal uncle even in the presence of the parents. 
                                                          
44 Report of the Commission on Marriages and Family Laws, The Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordi-
nary, Karachi, 20 June 1956, 1210. 
45 Ahmad 1959, p 218. 
46 Ahmad 1959, p 220. 
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If it is not appropriate to hand over the child to the mother due to her religion or profession 
then the court will decide by itself to whom the custody may be granted.47 
However Maulana Amin Ahsan Islahi (1904-1997) commenting on the reply of 
the Commission responded:  
It is correct that there is no explicit implication of Qur’an and Sunnah which prescribe[s] 
the age limit. But it does not mean that legists have fixed the limit just out of fancy and had 
no sound reasons for these deductions … a careful study of the verdicts of Prophet Moham-
mad (PBUH) in the cases that were brought before him reveal that a very basic consideration 
has been the welfare and wellbeing, education and training, protection and interests of the 
minor.48 
The questionnaire responses reflected the tensions that exist between the Mod-
ernists and the Traditionalists particularly in the context of the interpretation and 
application of family law reform in Pakistan.49 Traditionalists viewed legislation 
based on the Qur’anic precepts of law as the textual and immutable boundaries of 
Islamic family law jurisprudence. They viewed legislation as divinely ordained and 
capable of interpretation only by Mujtahids, through the process of Ijtihad. Modern-
ists on the other hand were of the view that law is something changeable, vibrant, 
and subject to interpretation.50 In the process of broadening the scope of ljtihad, the 
modernists envisioned a separation of legislative and judicial functions.51 In addi-
tion, the Modernists advocated that the judiciary should not be limited to scholars 
trained in Islamic law who would apply the code mechanically. Instead, the judiciary 
should include secularly trained judges who could and would interpret and apply the 
code and Common Law in tandem and on a case-by-case basis.52 The Modernists’ 
agenda was social justice whereas the Traditionalists’ agenda was to protect Islamic 
law from Western imperialist influences as well as to exert their own positions of 
power and authority in the community.53  
The clash between the Modernists and Traditionalists clearly surfaced in the dis-
cussions of the members of the Commission who used Ijtihad as a vehicle for bring-
ing change and reforming family law in Pakistan. The Commission specifically 
claimed in its report that independent legal reasoning, or Ijtihad, and the subsequent 
interpretation and application of family laws (both in the Qur’an and Sunnah and, 
later, in the Muslim Family Law Ordinance) was not limited to the Mujtahid, but 
                                                          
47 Rehman 1991, p 886-7. 
48 Pakistani Muslim scholar famous for his Quranic commentary ‘Tadabbur ul Qur’an’. He also 
served as a member of the Marriage and Family Law Commission set up by the Government of 
Pakistan in 1956. He was one of the founding members of Jamaat-e-Islami but abandoned the party 
in 1958. 
49 The Traditionalists and the Modernists stand between the two extreme groups, the Ulema and the 
Secularists. The Ulema, or the orthodox religious leaders, hold the extreme right-wing point of view 
while Secularists advocate a complete separation between religion and state. 
50 Pearl 1969, p 168. 
51 Haider 2000, p 292. 
52 Haider 2000, p 292. 
53 Haider 2000, p 293. 
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that even a secular judge could exercise Ijtihad.54 Coulson has very aptly depicted 
the difference of opinion between the Modernists and the Traditionalists’ approach 
by stating that the clash between the two was on: 
A single, determinative issue: the judicial power of interpretation versus traditional Islamic 
law as already interpreted by centuries of jurists... In other words, which was to prevail: the 
codified Islamic law or the common law function of judges to interpret and modify that law 
through their decisions?55 
Despite the fact that the recommendations of the Commission provided a road 
map for legislative reform, no action was taken on them. It was five years later in 
March 1961 that the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance 1961 (hereafter MFLO) was 
promulgated which incorporated some of the recommendations of the Commis-
sion.56 Under the MFLO, registration of marriage and divorce was made mandatory, 
a procedure was laid down for pronouncing divorce, and restrictions were imposed 
on polygamy. The MFLO was a significant step towards giving women and men 
equal rights, yet the MFLO failed in the sense that its reforms were weak and wa-
tered-down versions of the recommendations of the Commission on Marriage and 
Family Laws. Specifically, its reforms were prescriptions for procedural safeguards 
rather than clear prohibitions of certain acts. Additionally, it also remained silent on 
the issue of custody of minors. In sum, the MFLO reflected a compromise between 
the Traditionalists and Modernists. This compromise weakened the effect of the re-
forms. In 2000 the Federal Sharia Court held in Allah Rakha v. Federation of Paki-
stan PLD 2000 FSCI that it had jurisdiction to examine whether the MFLO is con-
sistent with Islam because the codified laws applicable to Muslims do not come un-
der the category of Muslim personal laws as mentioned in art. 203(c) of the Consti-
tution. However, this judgment has been assailed before the Supreme Court, and 
there has been no alteration of the law to date.57 
The main law that deals with custody and guardianship cases therefore remains 
the same, i.e. the Guardians and Wards Act 1890.  
7.4.2 The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 (Act VIII of 1890)  
The Guardians and Wards Act (hereafter GWA) is the main piece of legislation that 
governs custody and guardianship cases in Pakistan. The GWA consolidated the ear-
lier, sketchy legislation on the subject which included Act 40 of 1858, which was for 
                                                          
54 Report of the Commission on Marriage and Family Laws, Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, 20 
June 1956. 
55 Coulson 1957, p 137. 
56 Some of the Commission’s recommendations were incorporated in the Muslim Family Law Or-
dinance (MFLO) promulgated by Pakistan’s first military ruler, General Ayub Khan (1958-1969), 
in 1961. 
57 The Federal Sharia Court established in the Constitution by art. 203B(c) has jurisdiction to ex-
amine certain laws to ensure they are not repugnant to Islamic principles. The Court has original 
and appellate jurisdiction, but it does not have jurisdiction over the Constitution, Muslim personal 
law, or any laws relating to the procedure of any court or tribunal. 
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minors in the Presidency of Bengal and Madras, Act 20 of 1864 for the Presidency 
of Bombay, Act 9 of 1861, and Act 1874 for minors in territories beyond the juris-
diction of chartered High Courts. With the passage of time and after independence 
from the British colonial rule, some provisions of GWA lost their relevance and be-
came obsolete and redundant; for instance in Sec. 5 the power of parents to appoint 
a guardian where one of them is a European British subject has been omitted under 
the Federal Laws (Revision and Declaration) Ordinance 1981. The other legislative 
instrument was the West Pakistan Family Court Act, 1964 (hereafter WPFCA). Sec. 
5 WPFCA confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Family Courts to adjudicate upon 
matters specified in the Schedule, of which item No. 5 refers to the custody of chil-
dren. This provision has been made subject to the provisions contained in the MFLO 
and the Conciliation of Courts Ordinance of 1961. Sec. 25 WPFCA confers on the 
Family Court the status of a District Court for the purpose of the GWA and further 
provides that while dealing with these matters the same procedure as prescribed un-
der the GWA shall be followed. Sec. 47 GWA catalogues orders made by a Court, 
which are all appealable to the High Court, of which clause; (c) refers to an order 
made under Sec. 25. The Family Court as constituted under the WPFCA, having 
exclusive jurisdiction to deal, inter alia, with custody of children, is not a District 
Court in terms of the definition as laid down in Sec. 4(4) GWA and Sec. 2(4) Civil 
Procedure Code 1908. This with the exception that the deeming provision contained 
in Sec. 25 WPFCA has conferred that status on it while dealing with cases under the 
GWA. There is a separate law for Family Courts in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, 
which is The Azad Jammu and Kashmir Family Courts Act, 1993. These courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction to hear cases in the region concerning divorce, maintenance, 
custody, dower, restitution of conjugal rights, and guardianship. 
The objectives of the GWA are to promote the interests of children to make sure 
that a child may not suffer any discrimination or disadvantage because of the marital 
status of his or her parents. 
Recently, the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan in its meeting in 2007 
considered some further sections of the GWA and proposed to amend Sec. 6 of the 
Act by deleting the expression ‘who is not a European British Subject’.58 The Com-
mission also considered the discriminatory provisions contained in Sec. 19(b) of the 
Act, prescribing that the court is not to appoint a guardian for a minor whose father, 
in the opinion of the court, is not unfit to be guardian of the person of the minor. 
This proviso potentially excludes the mother even if she herself has a right to custody 
of the minor. Two honourable female members of the Commission stated that in the 
presence of the mother having custody, no guardian of the person of the child may 
be appointed if the mother is not, in the opinion of the court, unfit to be guardian of 
                                                          
58 The Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan is a Federal Government institution, established 
under an Ordinance (XIV) of 1979. The Commission is headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan and 
comprises twelve other members, including the Chief Justice of the Federal Shariat Court, Chief 
Justices of the High Courts, the Attorney General for Pakistan, the Secretary of the Ministry of Law 
& Justice, the Chairperson of the National Commission on the Status of Women, and four other 
members, one from each Province.  
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the person of the minor. This proposed amendment was approved by the Commis-
sion along with consequential amendment in Sec. 41(e) of the Act with regard to 
reference to the mother of the minor therein. 
Another legislative provision relevant in custody cases is Sec. 491 of the Criminal 
Procedure Code 1898, under which if a minor is held forcibly, interim custody is 
immediately restored to the mother. The WPFCA and the West Pakistan Family 
Court Rules are also invoked in such cases. Certain constitutional provisions may 
also be invoked in such disputes, such as the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts 
under art. 199 of the Constitution.  
In Pakistan, the GWA is applicable to custody and guardianship cases while keep-
ing in view the personal law to which the minor/ward is subject.59 Under the Majority 
Act 1875 (No IX), minority ceases upon the completion of eighteen years, unless a 
guardian of the person, or property, or both, of the minor has been or shall be ap-
pointed before the minor has attained the age of eighteen years, or the property of 
the minor is under the superintendence of a court of wards, in which case the age of 
minority is prolonged until the minor has completed the age of twenty-one years. 
Accordingly, notwithstanding classical Islamic law, a child remains a minor until the 
completion of eighteen years. Until then, the court has the power to appoint a guard-
ian for the child and her or his property or both under the provisions of the GWA.  
A minor is subject to the same personal law as his/her father. This law applies to 
Muslim and non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan. The established view is that ‘where 
the provisions of the personal law are in conflict with the provisions of the GWA, 
the latter will prevail over the former’.60 Sec. 25(1) explicitly concerns custody. It 
states that:  
If a ward leaves or is removed from the custody of a guardian of his person, the Court, if it 
is of the opinion that it will be for the welfare of the ward to return to the custody of his 
guardian, may make an order for his return.  
This proviso allows the court to intervene and to re-establish the original arrange-
ment of child custody in cases of divorce or separation between the husband and 
wife. But since both divorced parents may retain a form of custody, the mother ex-
ercises actual custody while the father relies on legal custody. The provision has 
been applied to transfer custody from one parent to the other, bearing in mind the 
                                                          
59 The relevant provision in this respect is Sec. 3 of the Majority Act 1875, which reads as follows: 
‘Subject as aforesaid, every minor, of whose person or property or both a guardian, other than for 
a suit within the meaning of Order XXXII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure 
1908 (No V), has been or shall be appointed or declared by any Court of Justice before the minor 
has attained the age of 18 years, and every minor of whose property the superintendence has been 
or shall be assumed by any Court of Wards before the minor has attained that age shall, notwith-
standing anything contained in the Succession Act 1925 (No XXXIX) or in any other enactment, 
be deemed to have attained his majority when he shall have completed his age of 21 years and not 
before. Subject as aforesaid, every other person domiciled in Pakistan shall be deemed to have 
attained his majority when he shall complete his age of 18 years and not before.’ 
60 Mulla 1938, p 45. 
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welfare of the ward.61 In other words, the Act provides room to the courts to disre-
gard classical Hanafi custodial hierarchy and empowers them to decide simple cus-
tody disputes between parents according to the minor’s welfare. If one of the parents 
has been declared unfit or has lost custodial rights for some other reason, Sec. 19(b) 
enables a court order in the child’s welfare. The court shall be guided by the law to 
which the minor is subject and shall consider the statutory factors listed above. When 
the minor’s father is living and has not been declared unfit, the court may not appoint 
a guardian but may apparently give mere custody to another person. 
The GWA empowers the court to hear the child’s opinion in guardianship and 
custody cases if the child is capable of articulating his preferences. The court, how-
ever, is not obliged to ascertain from the minor his wishes. What is required is to 
keep the best interests of the child in view and to reconcile the child’s opinion and 
the welfare rule if there is a conflict in these two requirements. The GWA does not 
state a specific age limit for the age of the child to be capable of expressing his 
preferences, and there is case law available in custody and guardianship cases where 
children have been heard in court. Ali, in her review of judicial cases from 1947-
1997, argues that neither the GWA nor the case law makes a clear distinction be-
tween the words ‘guardianship’ and ‘custody’; the terms are often used interchange-
ably, and no clearly defined parameters have been drawn to determine the nature and 
extent of the privileges inherent in the persons awarded either custody or guardian-
ship of a minor.62 Ali is of the view that the only inference that can be drawn from 
the case law analysis is that the word guardian is mostly used to refer to the legal 
guardian while custody is taken to refer to the mother or any female relative having 
physical possession of the minor.63 
7.4.3 Law of Guardianship in Pakistan  
7.4.3.1 Jurisdiction 
The application for guardianship should be made under the provisions of the GWA 
to the court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor ordinarily resides. If the 
application is with respect to the guardianship over the property of the minor, then 
it may be made either to the court having jurisdiction in the place where the minor 
ordinarily resides or to a court having jurisdiction in a place where the minor has 
property.  
                                                          
61 Sec. 25(1) Guardians and Wards Act, 1870. 
62 Ali and Azam 1998, p 151. 
63 Ali and Azam 1998, p 151. 
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7.4.3.2 Who May Be a Guardian? 
According to Sec. 4(2) GWA, a guardian is ‘a person having the care of the person 
of a minor, or of his property, or of both his person and property’. A guardian can 
be a de facto or a de jure guardian. Pursuant to the GWA, a father is the natural 
guardian of a child under the age of eighteen years. A de jure guardian is appointed 
by the court. A de facto guardian is a related person other than the father or grand-
father, e.g. the mother, a brother or an uncle. Other persons – such as the mother, 
other relatives (except the father and father’s father), or an institution like an orphan-
age – may voluntarily choose to take in charge the person or the property of a minor; 
a mother, however, is the next possible guardian after a father, unless the latter, by 
his will, has appointed another person as the guardian of the child. While appointing 
a de jure guardian, the character, the capacity, and the fitness of the individual should 
be taken into consideration.64  
7.4.3.3 Court Proceedings 
A person, including a relative or friend, who is interested in becoming a de jure 
guardian must apply to the court under the provisions of the GWA in order to be 
appointed as a guardian; he is not bound to wait until his legal title or fitness to act 
as guardian is disputed by another person. The procedure for such an application is 
stated in Sec. 10 of the GWA, and no order should be made unless notice of the 
application is given to persons interested in the minor. 
During the court proceedings, the court exercises parental jurisdiction over the 
child. The court is also empowered to give temporary custody and order protection 
of the person and property of the minor during the maintenance of the case. 
While appointing a guardian, the court must have regard to the welfare of the 
minor, which covers factors such as the age, sex, and religion of the child; the char-
acter and capacity of the proposed guardian and his nearness to the child; the wishes, 
if any, of the deceased parents as well as any existing or previous relations of the 
proposed guardian with regards to  the minor or his or her property; and if the child 
is old enough to form an intelligent preference, then such preference should also be 
considered. 
                                                          
64 A charitable society is not a person within the meaning of Sec. 4(2) of the GWA and thus cannot 
be appointed as the guardian of the person, or property, of the minor. It is due to the fact that anyone 
having an interest adverse to that of a minor cannot be appointed as a guardian. However, it has 
been held by courts that a manager of a registered society can be appointed as the guardian of a 
child. In the latter context, it has also been stated that the meaning of person in the context of being 
appointed a guardian should not be confined to an individual, despite Sec. 3(39) of the General 
Clauses Act as it would then conflict with GWA Secs 43(4) and 45. 
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7.4.3.4 Effects of Being Appointed as de jure Guardian  
A guardian is responsible for ensuring that the minor is supported, fed, housed, 
clothed, and educated in a manner suitable to his or her position in life, and to the 
fortune which he or she is likely to enjoy upon attaining the age of majority. The de 
jure guardian appointed by the court is entitled to such allowance as the court thinks 
fit for the minor’s care and for the effort that he or she goes through while undertak-
ing the duties. The allowance can be paid out of the property of the ward.  
A guardian appointed by the court without the court’s permission cannot remove 
the ward from the limits of the court’s jurisdiction. The permission can be special or 
general and can be specified in the court order. Illegal removal of a ward from the 
court’s jurisdiction is punishable with a fine not exceeding Rs 100065 or a jail term 
extending to six months. 
7.4.3.5 Cessation and Revocation of Guardianship 
A court, on the application of any interested person or on its own motion, may re-
move a guardian appointed or declared by it, or even a guardian appointed by will, 
for the following reasons (amongst others): 
 For abuse of trust; 
 For continued failure to perform the duties of his trust;  
 For incapacity to perform the duties of his trust; 
 For ill-treatment or neglect in taking proper care of the ward; 
 For contumacious disregard of any of the GWA’s provisions or of any of 
the court orders; 
 For conviction of an offense implying a defect of character; 
 For having an interest adverse to the faithful performance of his duties; 
 For ceasing to reside within the local limits of the court’s jurisdiction; 
 For bankruptcy or insolvency in the case of a guardian of property. 
A guardian may also apply to the court for discharge from the responsibility of 
being a guardian. A person also ceases to be a guardian in the case of his or her 
death, removal; upon the ward ceasing to be a minor; upon the female ward’s mar-
riage to a husband who is not unfit to be her guardian; or upon the court itself as-
suming superintendence of the minor. 
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26  Ayesha Shahid  and Isfandyar Ali Khan  
7.4.4 Judicial Decisions in Custody and Guardianship Cases in 
Pakistan  
As discussed earlier in this report, a general view prevalent in Pakistan based on 
classical Hanafi principle is that in cases of marital breakup the father is to be given 
custody of a male child at the age of seven and custody of a female child on her 
attaining puberty. The courts in Pakistan, however, have deviated from this classical 
Hanafi principle and have based their judgments on the ‘Best Interests of the Child’ 
principle. This section provides a review of cases from 1997 to 2013 in which the 
courts have upheld the principle of the best interests of the child and given custody 
to the best-suited person. Pakistani courts have demonstrated considerable sensitiv-
ity for the child’s emotional and financial well-being in interpreting the concept of 
‘welfare’, and while upholding the principle courts have at times granted custody 
even to a grandparent if such grandparent appears better placed to ensure the child’s 
welfare than, for example, the mother of the child. At the same time, as shall be 
shown below, parenting agreements have been taken into consideration by the courts 
when deciding child custody disputes.  
7.4.4.1 Case Law 
Visitation Rights and Violation of a Parental Agreement 
In Ali Hayat v. Khalid Shafi and 2 others,66 the contention of the father/applicant 
was that the children’s mother had moved them to a new house and denied him his 
visitation rights in violation of the parenting agreement at the time of divorce. The 
contentions of the mother were that the present application under Sec. 491 Cr.PC 
was ineffectual as the children were allowed to remain in her custody in pursuance 
of the parenting agreement and that according to the this agreement all disputes had 
to be first referred to a mediator. The High Court directed that both parties should 
follow the parenting agreement and might sit together to renegotiate the agreement, 
keeping in view the best interests and welfare of their children; that as an interim 
measure the mother would allow the father to meet the children three times a week 
for two hours each, and such interim measure would be valid for up to thirty days; 
that both parties would not remove the minors from the city without an order of the 
competent court; that the father would continue to deposit monthly expenses; and 
that in the event of a failure to reach an amicable settlement outside court within 
thirty days, the parties would be at liberty to approach the Guardian Judge for re-
dressal of their grievance. The court further held that in matters pertaining to children 
the courts should not go into legal technicalities and should decide the case keeping 
in view the facts and circumstances of each case, mainly taking into consideration 
the welfare of the child. 
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Failure to Provide Maintenance 
In Iftikhar Ahmad Chisti v. District Judge, Chakwal and others,67 the failure to pro-
vide maintenance to the children, a second marriage, and children from the second 
marriage were reasons for not granting custody to the father despite his claims that 
he could provide a better education to the children. In this case a constitutional peti-
tion for custody of the minors was filed by the father (as a suit of petitioner (father) 
for the custody of minors was dismissed concurrently by the Guardian Court and 
Appellate Court). The petitioner admitted that he had failed to pay the maintenance 
under the decree of the Family Court and that he had been detained in civil prison. 
The Court held that if a father failed to make maintenance payments and then liti-
gated against the custody of minors and finally did not pay the maintenance even 
after the decree of the court and preferred to go to civil prison, it could be safely 
presumed that he was not interested in the welfare and well-being of the minors. The 
petitioner was also living with his second wife, and he had children from his second 
wife. The court further held that the step-mother could not bestow the love and af-
fection which would be given by the real mother. In such circumstances it was not 
in the welfare of the minors to be given to the petitioner. The court further held that 
the petitioner’s contentions that better education facilities were available at the place 
where the petitioner was residing and that the petitioner had better financial means 
than the respondent were not valid grounds for putting the minors in his custody. 
Failure to provide maintenance by the father was also a ground for not awarding 
custody to the father in Karim Bakhsh v. Muhammad Bakhsh;68 instead the custody 
of the child was given back to the maternal uncle as he and the maternal grandmother 
were looking after the child, and the minor had also expressed his willingness to live 
with his maternal relatives. 
Although the courts have held that providing maintenance is the responsibility of 
the father, his wealth and financial status cannot be the grounds for giving him the 
custody of the child. In Mst. Iram Shahzad and 2 others v. Additional District Judge, 
Lahore,69 the Court held that the ostensible wealth of father can never be a ground 
entitling him to custody of his minor whereas age, gender, and the marital status of 
the parties are factors which are to be taken into consideration for arriving at a con-
clusion as to how the interests and welfare of the minor can be best protected; more-
over, such factors are not to be considered in contradistinction to the welfare of mi-
nor. The court held that the welfare of the minor is of paramount importance and the 
sole determining feature/factor. Referring to Islamic law, the court held that it is the 
responsibility of the father to provide maintenance to the child, but the court also 
categorically dismissed the option of sending the child abroad and to be looked after 
by a maid. The Court further held that ‘[n]o mother deserves to be put through the 
agony of permanently parting with her offspring or forced yet again to invoke the 
                                                          
67 Iftikhar Ahmad Chisti v. District Judge Chakwal and others, PLD 2012 Lah 670. 
68 Karim Bakhsh v. Muhammad Bakhsh, CLC 1997 316. 
69 Mst. Iram Shahzad and 2 others v. Additional District Judge Lahore, PLD 2011 Lah 362. 
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jurisdiction of a foreign court’; therefore the custody was awarded to the mother of 
the minor. 
Custody and Prohibited Degree of Relationship 
The courts have also taken into consideration prohibited degrees of relation while 
awarding custody of the child. In Mst. Aziza v. SSP, District Tando Muhammad Khan 
and 3 others,70 the court allowed the application for recovery of a minor who was 
living with grandparents and a cousin who came under a prohibited degree of rela-
tionship. The court held that as the relationship between the minor and her cousin 
fell within the prohibited degree, it was therefore in the best interests of the child 
that she should live with her real mother instead of her cousin and grandparents, who 
could hardly walk and hence could not contribute towards the welfare of the minor. 
The court also held that under Islamic law the mother was most entitled to the cus-
tody of the minor girl. 
Age of the Child and Recognition of Motherhood 
In Mst. Gulnaz v. Mst. Amina and others71 the court held that ‘as [the] mother of 
minors was alive and able to take care of her minors and there could be no better 
cradle for the minors than their mother’s lap, denying such natural right would be 
utter cruelty and grave injustice’. The Court further held that it would be best and in 
the interests and welfare of the minors that they were reunited with their mother. In 
this case, the Court very clearly emphasized the significance of the mother’s role 
and how it is linked to the welfare of the child as there could be no better substitute 
for the minors than the mother herself. 
Second Marriage and Awarding Custody to Grandparents 
The second marriage of the mother has in some cases resulted in her not being 
awarded the custody of the child. In Mst. Aneeta Tanveer v. Muhammad Younas,72 
the Family Court refused to give custody of the minor child to the petitioner (mother) 
who had entered a second marriage after a mutually agreed divorce from her first 
husband. The facts of the case were that after the mother’s second marriage the child 
was living with the maternal grandfather and was being well looked after by him. 
The court held that: (i) the petitioner mother of the minor had no source of income; 
(ii) she had remarried, and she had been blessed with three children after her remar-
riage; (iii) her second husband was a stranger as far as the minor was concerned; (iv) 
her second husband had declined to testify about his income and whether he was 
                                                          
70 Mst. Aziza v. SSP, District Tando Muhammad Khan and 3 others, YLR 2012 2881. 
71 Mst. Gulnaz v. Mst. Amina and others, CLC 2012 761. 
72 Mst. Aneeta Tanveer v. Muhammad Younas, YLR 2010 513. 
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willing to shoulder responsibilities in connection with the minor; (v) the maternal 
grandfather was a retired servant and was receiving a pension; (vi) the maternal 
grandfather had his own house, whereas the mother and step-father of the minor 
lived in a rented house; (vii) the real father of the minor had no objection to the 
child’s remaining with his maternal grandfather; and finally (viii) the child had been 
receiving education while living with the maternal grandfather. Taking into consid-
eration these grounds, the court decided that it was in the best interests of the child 
to remain with the maternal grandfather. 
Josip Stimac and others v. Melitta Syed Shah and others73 was a case of an Aus-
trian drug trafficker travelling with her children who was arrested at the airport. A 
case under Sec. 9(c) and Sec. 15, Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 was 
registered against her, and she was subsequently confined in jail as an under trial 
prisoner; the minors were also confined with their mother, especially for the reason 
that at the time of her remand before the magistrate she requested to keep them as 
she was a foreigner and had no relation or friend in Pakistan to take care of them. 
The mother of minors wrote a letter to the Austrian embassy seeking to have the 
minors sent to Austria so that they could live with her parents (the petitioners). The 
Austrian embassy could not succeed in getting the minors released without the 
court’s order for custody. Making reference to art. 199(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution 
and Sec. 491 Cr.PC, the maternal grandparents of the minors (through their counsel) 
moved the High Court for release of the minors and their transfer to the custody of 
the grandparents, contending that they were in custody improperly and illegally. The 
request further alleged that with their mother herself having made a request that the 
minors be sent to her parents abroad, it was in the welfare of the minors to live with 
their grandparents and elder brother and to have a proper education as the parents of 
minors were involved in drug trafficking and had a blatant track record. The grand-
parents had obtained a custody order from the Austrian courts for the minors. The 
court held that ‘prima facie it seemed in the welfare of the minors that they should 
be sent back to their home country, which, undoubtedly, was a welfare state and 
capable of taking care of even those children whose parents were not there’. The 
High Court observed that  
there was apprehension that the minors may not be used as a shield or carrier for any sordid 
business and if it so happened, the life of the minors shall be ruined, therefore, it was in the 
best interest of the minors that their custody be given to the grandparents as requested, 
particularly when [the] elder brother of the minors, was there and was old enough to look 
after them. 
In two other cases custody was given to the maternal aunt and the uncle, respec-
tively.74 In the former case the father had filed a petition for custody of his son, who 
was living with his maternal aunt since he was only fifteen days old following the 
death of his mother. The court held that the mere fact that minor had attained the age 
of seven years would not ipso facto entitle his father to his custody as a matter of 
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74 Mst. Nighat Firdous v. Khadim Hussain, SCMR 1998 1593, and Karim Bakhsh v. Muhammad 
Bakhsh, CLC 1997 316. 
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right. The court, emphasising the best interests of the child principle, stated that ‘the 
right of father to claim custody of minor was not an absolute right and the father 
being lawful guardian of his minor child would be entitled to his custody, provided 
it was for the welfare of minor’. In the latter case the minor was not happy living 
with his father, who, on receiving his custody, had engaged him to earn a livelihood 
for his family members by working as laborer despite the main ground in his appli-
cation for custody of the minor having been that he was not receiving an education. 
The Court held that the minor’s welfare was not being served by living with his 
father and that his interest was instead best served while in the custody of his mater-
nal uncle, where his grandmother was there to look after him; the minor had also 
expressed his willingness to live with his maternal relatives. Taking into considera-
tion the child’s wishes and his welfare, the High Court set aside the orders of the 
lower courts that granted custody of the minor to his father, and the minor child was 
allowed to live with his maternal uncle. 
Habeas Corpus Petitions and Jurisdiction of the Court 
In Mst. Zohra Hilal v. Noor Sakht Shah75 the petitioner claimed that her minor 
daughter had been detained by the respondent/father of the minor improperly and 
illegally. The court dismissed the petition on two grounds: firstly, in the trial court 
the minor, when given the choice, opted for living with her father; and secondly, the 
court held that as it was a case of child custody arising out of a marital dispute, it 
should be decided in the court of the Guardian Judge or Family Court and not as a 
habeas corpus petition under Sec. 491 of the Cr.PC. In a similar case in 2005, the 
court refused to decide the case under Sec. 491 Cr.PC (habeas corpus) and held that 
‘this power being extraordinary in nature, should be sparingly used because paternal 
jurisdiction in the matter rested under Guardians and Wards Act, 1890’.76 The court 
further held that the Superior Courts had exercised jurisdiction under Sec. 491 Cr.PC 
only in cases of real urgency, and such powers were exercised when the minor was 
of tender age. The court further held that ‘the interest of suckling baby would be best 
served if he/she was handed over to mother as the life, health, or upbringing of the 
minor was in serious jeopardy’. The court refused to give custody to the mother on 
the grounds that the minors were well-settled; they attended their school regularly; 
the school fees, which were approximately Rs. 5,000 for two months for three mi-
nors, were being paid by the father of the minors without any default; the academic 
results of the minors were exceptional, and their attendance was maximum; and if 
the minors were removed from the school, their education was likely to suffer ad-
versely. Keeping in view the age, welfare, education, and prevailing circumstances 
of the case, no justification existed to interfere in the custody of the minors.  
Conversely, in Mst. Moomal v. Jumo Salaro Mir Khan and another77 the habeas 
corpus petition of the mother of the minors under Sec. 491 was allowed, and the 
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76 Mst. Tasneem Fatima v. Arshad Mehmood and another, YLR 2005 883. 
77 Mst. Moomal v. Jumo Salaro Mir Khan and another, PCr.LJ 1998 1535. 
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High Court permitted petitioner/mother to take the minors with her in order to ensure 
their welfare. In this case the children stated before the court that their father was 
being abusive to them. He had been extending threats to them, and on a number of 
occasions had also frightened them by pointing a gun towards them. In view of the 
statements of the minors the Court concluded that  
even if respondent/father of minors was not detaining them illegally … he was keeping 
them in his house improperly and restraint on two minors was patently unjust, cruel and not 
in the best interest of two minors and their welfare and proper upbringing would be ad-
versely affected[;] therefore custody must be awarded to the mother. 
 Custody Issues in Polygamous Marriages  
In Mst. Jamila Begum v. Mirza Muhammad and 2 others,78 where the father had 
contracted polygamous marriages the court awarded the custody of children back to 
the mother, who had been deprived of her children by concurrent orders of two courts 
on the sole ground of poverty. The High Court held that the courts misread the evi-
dence, wherein it was categorically stated that the children in custody of the mother 
were happy and were receiving proper education. Evidence also showed that the fa-
ther of the minor children was a crane operator who had contracted two other mar-
riages, and in his meagre pay he could not be expected to send his children to a high 
standard educational institution. The Court further held that due to his polygamous 
marriages,  
the welfare of the minors in the presence of two step-mothers in the same house could not 
be stated to be more safe than in the custody of their real mother who after divorce neither 
had contracted [a] second marriage nor her character and occupation was such that custody 
of minors could be refused to her. 
Child Abduction Cases 
In the recent past, two French mothers (Ingrid Brandun Berger in 2012 and Peggy 
Collins in 2009) were allowed to take their children back to France after a struggle 
in the Pakistani higher courts. Their battle to secure the custody of their children was 
an onerous task but a successful one.79 In both cases the grounds advanced by the 
fathers for retaining their children were based on religious and moral concerns. 
In Berger’s case, the father of the child claimed that he was his daughter’s rightful 
custodian based on his religious beliefs. He argued that he brought his daughter to 
Pakistan and kept her there because both father and daughter are Muslims, and he 
wanted his daughter to live in Pakistan. The girl’s grandfather also wished not to see 
his granddaughter ‘growing up as an infidel’ in a Western liberal culture. The case 
of Peggy Collins was similar, in which the father retained his nine-year-old son in 
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Pakistan, and he argued – referring to several judgments given by the Supreme 
Court, the Mohammadan law, and Hedaya – that the custody of the child should not 
be given to an alienated non-Muslim mother who would encourage the boy to devi-
ate from his father’s religion. Such arguments, based on the mother’s religion or 
culture, were not taken into account by the Pakistani courts.80 In both cases, the 
judges made their decision according to logic, justice, good conscience, and the 
child’s best interests. In Berger’s case especially, the court observed that the father 
did not give any consideration to the mother’s religion when he married her. His ex-
wife’s religion, culture, or nationality obviously did not matter when he fell in love 
and married her. According to the court, accepting arguments such as faith, nation-
ality, and culture would have been adverse to justice, equity, and good conscience. 
In both cases, the child’s best interests were the courts’ primary consideration in 
granting custody of these minors to their mothers. Moreover, the Pakistani judges 
respected foreign court orders. Those stated that the fathers had broken some foreign 
laws, resulting in a deprivation of education and proper welfare for their children. 
In another unique case, Roshni Desai, a Canadian national of Indian origin, came 
to reclaim the custody of her three-and-half-year-old son and filed a habeas corpus 
application under Sec. 491 of the Cr.PC before the Lahore High Court.81 The father 
argued that, according to the Islamic laws, a Muslim child could not be entrusted to 
a non-Muslim mother. Since the child was born out of wedlock, the court drew at-
tention to the fact that not only was it difficult to determine which parent should be 
granted custody of the child, but that living in the Pakistani culture would also prove 
troublesome for the child due to his illegitimate status. The court allowed the mother 
to take the child back to Canada and stated that Islamic law does not allow a father 
to keep custody of his illegitimate child. In such situations, the custody can only be 
given to the mother. The court further observed that: ‘Under Islamic laws, the bond 
between a mother and her illegitimate child is stronger than the bond between this 
child and his/her father. And a father cannot become guardian of his illegitimate 
child.’ The judge ruled that, as a single mother, she had the exclusive right of cus-
tody. 
In the case of twelve-year-old Scottish-Pakistani girl Misbah Rana, the girl’s 
mother, Louise Campbell, approached the High Court of Lahore and filed a lawsuit 
against her ex-husband and Misbah’s elder sister, both of whom had illegally taken 
Misbah to Pakistan.82 She claimed that Misbah should be sent back to Scotland and 
the custody matter decided by the relevant court in Scotland, as per the UK-Pakistan 
Protocol. Louise Rana was worried that Misbah would be forced to marry at her 
early age, whereas Misbah consistently denied, through a news conference, that her 
Pakistani family was trying to force her into such a union. After listening to both 
parties’ arguments, the Court ordered that Misbah should be handed over to the Brit-
ish High Commission within seven days so that the case could be decided as per the 
Protocol and the custody issue heard in Scotland’s relevant court. Upon hearing that 
                                                          
80 Peggy Collins v. Muhammad Ishfaque Malik (2009) PLD 48 Lahore High Court, para 4. 
81 Roshan Desai v. Jahanzeb Niaz (2011) PLD 423 Lahore High Court.  
82 Louise Ann Fairley v. Sajjad Ahmad Rana (2007) PLD 300 Lahore High Court. 
7 Pakistan 33 
she would be handed over to her mother, Misbah protested against the Court’s deci-
sion and expressed her desire not to go back to Scotland. On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan set aside the judgment of the High Court of Lahore and mediated 
a settlement between the parties. Misbah herself stated that she did not want to reside 
with her mother because she forbade her from practicing her faith, gave her haram 
food, and was living with a man outside of marriage. Owing to Misbah’s wish to 
stay with her father, the court allowed Misbah to stay with her father and granted 
access to her mother so that she could visit her daughter under certain conditions. 
In Misbah’s case, the court respected Misbah’s point of view, as envisaged in art. 
12 and art. 9(2) of the UNCRC: ‘In any proceedings …, all interested parties shall 
be given an opportunity to participate in the proceedings and make their views 
known.’ 
7.4.4.2 Evaluation  
The review of these cases shows that by taking a proactive approach the superior 
judiciary in Pakistan has moved away from the traditional Islamic classical law on 
custody and guardianship and has applied the ‘best interests of the child’ principle 
by using judicial discretion. One example of exercising judicial discretion is the La-
hore High Court decision in Munawar Jan v. M Afsar Khan case,83 in which the court 
declared that the welfare of the child should take precedence over the personal law. 
The court held that: ‘If there is a conflict between the personal law to which the 
minor is subject and considerations of his or her welfare the latter must prevail’. This 
shows that even in the presence of classical Hanafi Muslim personal law, the courts 
have given preference to the best interests of the child and on that basis have given 
custody to the mother. Additionally, the Courts have also used various frames of 
reference to ascertain this principle; for instance, a failure to provide maintenance 
has been a ground for not giving custody to the father, and wealth of the father was 
also not considered as a ground to give him the custody of children. Similarly, ma-
ternal relations have been given preference over the father in the absence of a natural 
mother of the minor if the father has failed to provide maintenance to the minors. 
The court has also considered the views of the child in deciding custody matters. At 
the same time, remarriage and the weak financial position of the mother were 
grounds for not awarding custody to the mother as this would have an impact on the 
best interests of the child. It has also been observed in the review of the cases that 
the personal situation of the parents matter, as a mother was awarded custody of 
male child because she was well-educated and in a financially stable position to sup-
port the male child. From the cases discussed above it has also become clear that the 
courts can decide against a parental agreement on custody if, according to the court, 
the agreement contradicts the interests of the child.  
It is also interesting to note that the judgments given by the lower courts reflect a 
more conservative approach. The decisions of the lower courts show that classical 
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Hanafi law as interpreted in Hedaya, societal norms, and the patriarchal structure of 
the society are some of the influential factors that have an impact on the decisions. 
By contrast, the decisions of the superior judiciary are more enlightened and reflect 
that the superior judiciary has made decisions on the basis of the principles of equity, 
justice, and good conscience. The review of judgments from Pakistani courts reveals, 
however, that there do not appear to be readily available examples of court cases 
where the judges have used or applied the CRC or other relevant international in-
struments. At the same time, in a few cases of child abduction we find references to 
the UK/Pakistan Judicial Protocol. One obvious reason for this could be that under 
Pakistani law courts are not bound to apply international law principles.  
In Child abduction cases, Pakistani parents who abduct their child (usually the 
fathers) often base their decision on moral grounds, as they fear that the religion of 
the mother and the immorality of Western cultures may taint their children and ren-
der them immoral. Such claims or arguments based on religion or culture have been 
rejected by Pakistani courts; instead, the best interests of the child principle has been 
upheld and non-Muslim mothers have been given the custody of their children. 
7.5  Conclusion 
This study has shown that centuries of Muslim rule and British colonial domination 
in the Indian sub-continent has resulted in a cross-fertilization of religious and Com-
mon Law principles. This is reflected in the constitutional and legislative frame-
works adopted in Pakistan. Further, by ratifying the UNCRC, Pakistan has under-
taken the international obligation of bringing its laws in consonance with interna-
tional human rights standards. However, ratified international instruments do not 
automatically have the force of law in Pakistan and must be incorporated through 
implementing legislation. In the absence of implementing legislation, provisions of 
international treaties, including the UNCRC, are addressed throughout national leg-
islation in a piecemeal, subject-by-subject manner. 
From the review of case law it has become evident that in its decisions the supe-
rior judiciary has avoided the rigid application of the principles of established Mus-
lim jurisprudence and shifted family law from the realm of the civil to that of the 
Common Law. The ‘welfare or best interests of the child’ has been the guiding factor 
in deciding on the custody of children, and personal law based on classical Islamic 
principles has remained subordinate to such consideration before the courts. Thus, 
the sole criteria which must prevail is always the welfare of child, and overall cus-
tody is perceived foremost as a right of the child. To conclude in the words of Cas-
sandra Balchin, ‘Courts in Pakistan have succeeded in making inroads into estab-
lished Muslim Jurisprudence and have at times over ridden [sic] express provisions 
of law to safeguard the best interest of the child.’84 
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